Generational labels function as a historically specific technology for ordering persons; the classification itself, not the cohorts it names, requires analysis. Drawing on Foucault’s archaeological and genealogical methods, the article traces the grid’s descent through state registration, demography, journalism, marketing and consultancy, showing how it imposes discrete essences on a continuum of births, scales disciplinary seriation to the population, generates looping effects, and recodes structural antagonisms as conflicts between age cohorts. The 2026 Indian mobilisation, branded a “Gen Z” uprising, serves as the principal test case: its composition, demands and alliances exceed any single cohort, demonstrating the non-contemporaneity of the contemporaneous. The Yayati–Babur circuit names the patriarchal mechanism that sustains this reduction. Within the same mobilisation the slogans of the dominant are echoed by the street; the echoing, read through Bhabha’s mimicry and Guha’s prose of counter-insurgency, opens a Third Space in which the national cry is made to carry a demand the apparatus refuses to hear. A parallel episode during Durga Puja in West Bengal—attacks on Left bookstalls resisted by student cadres of comparable age—further shows that shared birth years explain neither the violence nor the defence. The article rejects “mental age” as an alternative scale and proposes instead the plurality of temporalities that run through every subject and every movement.
Category Archives: Journal
CONVERGENCE TO PRAXIS
This journal tries to demolish the administrative boundaries of academic disciplinary technology by amalgamating all the so-called “subjects” by condemning the objectification, subjectification and subjection.
It strives to reach the vanishing point of theory and praxis. Thus, instead of so-called “inter-disciplinary studies”, it emphasizes on the convergence of earthian knowledges and praxiologies. The journal attempts to achieve this end by means of dialogue without manipulation in the context of a participatory, local-resource based, low-energy efficient, small-scale, self-reliant, partyless, moneyless, decentralized democracy. As this journal is against the academiocratic elitism and patron-client relationship, it maintains the Copyleft Writers’ Movement and follows the Creative Commons License.
The Crony Cakravyūha: Auditing the Adani-BJP Collusion
Between 2014 and 2026 one private citizen, Gautam Adani, came to control major shares of India’s ports, airports, coal, thermal and solar power, transmission, smart meters, city gas, cement, roads, water, defence, data centres, Asia’s largest informal settlement, a national television network and a news agency, while the BJP government and BJP-ruled states cleared his path through one-rupee land at Mundra and Pirpainti, rules rewritten before tenders that delivered coal blocks and all six airports he bid for, agency raids that preceded the Mumbai airport, NDTV and Coastal Energen takeovers, the 2020 farm laws that lifted stock limits after Adani lobbying, public money that arrived when private lenders fled, and foreign contracts that followed the Prime Minister’s tours. The record assembled here — from the Hindenburg and OCCRP exposés cleared by SEBI on a technicality, to the 2024 US bribery indictment that ended in 2026 after an India–US trade deal, a $10 billion pledge and the hiring of President Trump’s lawyer, a $275 million OFAC penalty for Iranian gas, a reported $3.9 billion LIC plan, the Mundra heroin route, the destruction of Hasdeo, Godda, Bhagalpur, the Galilee Basin, the coasts of Kutch and Kerala, the proposed Great Nicobar project, and the files the same formation has kept closed — shows public land, public money, public regulators, public forests and public diplomacy systematically feeding one private balance sheet whose profits return as political power. This is not merely crony capitalism at the margin of a market economy. It is a crony cakravyūha: a closed spiral, built and defended by the BJP, in which every turn makes the next easier and escape harder for everyone caught inside it.
Dissent, Dynamics and Domination: India’s Protest Movements (2014-26)
Between May 2014 and October 2026, India’s BJP-led National Democratic Alliance confronted an almost unbroken sequence of protest and resistance—from the 2015 land-ordinance agitation and the 2020–21 farmers’ siege of Delhi to the 2026 youth-led Cockroach Janta Party (CJP) rising—under conditions of sustained political domination rather than the successful production of consent. This article maps the ecology of that dissent: the movements themselves; a counter-public of non-Godi and crowdfunded media; satirists and stand-up comedians deploying hasya and vyanga against the regime’s bhayanaka and vibhatsya; organic intellectuals of political and civil society; dissenting advocates and judges; and watchdog NGOs. It documents the repertoire of domination deployed against them—imprisonment without trial, preventive detention, financial and regulatory strangulation, blocking, SLAPP litigation, career reprisals, threats, vigilante violence, surveillance, state violence and assassination by non-state actors—and reads the CJP against this longer inheritance through Gramsci’s account of hegemony and organic intellectuals, Partha Chatterjee’s distinction between civil and political society, Habermas’s concept of legitimation crisis, Ranajit Guha’s dominance without hegemony, and Ambedkar’s warning against bhakti in politics. The CJP’s speed and visibility rest on more than a decade of prior investigation, litigation and protest. Its demand for the resignation of named officeholders addresses persons rather than the paradigm or the chair; under a regime that has already closed ordinary channels and made the power to guarantee life the underside of the power to expose marked populations to the sovereign mark, the absorption of a name is the state’s work, not the movement’s. The article treats the CJP as a genuine opening for a new constituency whose unarmed presence has already forced the repressive and ideological apparatuses into public view. The further task is to keep the energy released by that showing from being returned, through the regime’s mechanisms of absorption and attribution, to the chairs that still decide who is to be made live and who is to be marked.
The Street Army: Bajrang Dal
The official Indian record of Bajrang Dal and Sangh Parivar violence does not cohere on its own terms: it counts its dead by the dozen in cow-protection attacks while securing convictions by the handful, files named killers as anonymous mobs of thousands, convicts the gang-rapists of a pregnant woman and then releases them to garlands, and constitutes commissions only to bury their findings. This dossier reads that systematic incoherence as the evidence itself. The Bajrang Dal was manufactured by the RSS in 1984–86 as a deniable youth militia for the Ayodhya campaign; it has since operated, with BJP-supplied licence, as a cadre street-army whose repertoire—gau-raksha lynching, moral policing, anti-Christian violence, processions-as-detonators, and filmed humiliation—runs from the Babri demolition through Kandhamal, Gujarat 2002 (including Naroda Patiya and Bilkis Bano), the post-2014 lynching years (Akhlaq, Pehlu Khan, Tabrez Ansari), Nuh 2023, and Kathua. The same architecture converts authored atrocity into unprosecutable events through non-registration, reclassification, dilution, attrition, and inversion, while routing unemployed young men from shakha to Bajrang Dal, Sri Ram Sene, and Hindu Raksha Dal. In 2026 the machine applied direct state terrorism—mass preventive detention, blackouts, and site denotification—against the non-violent Cockroach Janta Party protest at Jantar Mantar, while a self-identified Hindutva affiliate’s filmed confession of assault received delayed process and restored liberty. The licence is not the absence of a finding; it is the finding. The record is the charge.
A Glimpse into Saffron Fascism: The RSS and the Sangh
This exposé treats the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS) and its Sangh Parivar not as mere faith but as a political technology: a durable and unregistered apparatus for manufacturing majoritarian-theocratic consent, disciplining populations and capturing the state. Scaffolded by Althusser, Gramsci, Foucault and Durkheim, it follows the organisation from its 1925 founding and abstention from the freedom struggle through Golwalkar’s programme of subordination without citizen’s rights, the semitisation of a colonial umbrella-term, “Hinduism,” into a pasteurised monolith, and the Akhand Bharat imagi-nation in which Partition is a wound and “go to Pakistan” a confession that the map is a poster. It tracks the saturation of civil society by more than fifty affiliates, the money without a ledger, the drills and the arms, the gendered order of Durga and Sita, the caste contract Meghwanshi watched fail at his own kitchen, and the documented violence against Muslims, Christians, Dalits and women, made costless by a reproducible impunity loop and extended, on paper, through the CAA, the NRC and the voter-roll revision. As a whole, this work adds the insider record of those who left, a sourced Register of the Dead and Harmed with the legal status of every case as it stood on 2 October 2026, and the questions the Sangh has never answered. It demands that the RSS, thrice banned and never reformed, be proscribed and its enforcement wings dissolved. The centenary count, more than 83,000 daily shakhas in 2025, claimed to be rising toward 89,000 in 2026, is taken not as tribute but as a confession of scale.
Ātmadīpa: The Non-Schooling Praxeogogy
Ātmadīpa is a non-school and a praxeo-gogy: not a greener exam-machine but a commons in which a people learns to inhabit a watershed in the polycrisis — lamp and island unto itself, and in the same motion a support to others. Head, hand and heart are taught as one and never ranked; the institution is deschooled. It resists the sale of learning, the capture of the curriculum, and the credential that pretends to be knowing. Its fields are the crafts of home-as-habitat — food, water, shelter, care, dissent, grief — held free at the point of use, federated without a headquarters, open-licensed, unfinished on purpose. Kindle your own lamp. Its only use is to light the road everyone walks.
The Goonda Returns: How a Category Became a Statute (Again!)
On 13 July 2026 West Bengal’s new BJP government announced that the Public Safety and Control of Anti-Social Activities Act (gunḍā-damana) and the Maintenance of Public Order (Amendment) Act were in force. The first allows twelve months’ charge-free detention of anyone a magistrate or commissioner deems a reputational “goonda,” criminalises harbouring the externed, and permits year-long district banishment. The second lets a Claims Commission attach and auction the property of alleged rioters and of protest organisers, financiers, instigators and logistical supporters, up to twice assessed damage. A High Court bench later treated the Public Safety instrument as still awaiting assent; the government had already declared midnight commencement. The article reads both statutes as Bengal’s own colonial archive reprinted — Regulation III of 1818, Rowlatt 1919, the Goondas Act 1923, the 1929 Safety Bill against which Bhagat Singh timed the Assembly bombs — and as a Foucaultian status crime. Against ICCPR Articles 9, 12, 14, 15, 19, 21–22, General Comment 35 and CCPR/C/IND/CO/4 (2024), the design fails at every limb; India’s 1979 Article 9 declaration does not shelter what Article 22 never required. The same circuit is the impunity loop mapped in OBMA’s DHFL and bulldozer work. A coda tests damana against daṇḍanīti, sets ADR affidavits inside the definition, and reads anyonya-pratibimba, Barthesian myth, and the July naming of Forward Bloc as goonda as a category that cannot close. It ends with a protocol: document the order, litigate the interior, internationalise now, count who is named, protect the harbourer. The goonda of the file is not the person. The second file is the remaining procedure.
Maoists Without Mao: The Misnomer of Indian ‘Maoism’
India’s so-called Naxalite–CPI (Maoist) “insurgency”, declared “effectively finished” around 2026, is called “Maoist” by the state, the press, and the movement itself; this article treats that name as a misnomer that does ideological work. It reconstructs Mao’s actual method — concrete analysis in On Practice and On Contradiction, the gun-and-pen doctrine of Yan’an, sinification rather than imported catechism, self-reliant base areas, a restless Confucian–classical substratum, and the brief Hundred Flowers opening toward a plural field of standpoints later formalised, in another idiom, as overdetermination by Althusser — and shows that the Indian movement kept the words and dropped the grammar: iconolatry (“China’s Chairman is India’s Chairman”), MLM as a frozen universal system, Gutian-condemned annihilationist militarism, and a parasitic levy-and-loot economy on a mineral frontier that is not the feudal countryside the doctrine presupposes. The name was decided; the referent would not coincide with Mao. Mapping the Red Corridor onto bauxite, iron, coal, chromite and uranium, and walking Bastar, Kalinganagar, Niyamgiri and Jadugoda through Marx, Sanyal and Levien on primitive accumulation and the need economy, it argues that “Maoist” functions as a security brand affixed to Adivasi resistance to ecological dispossession, while Foucault’s warning about people’s courts is inverted in bulldozer (in)justice. What remains is a compound the doctrine cannot cover: a frontier defence of jal–jangal–zameen, a Blanquist core, the armed edge of the governed. The brand erases the dispossessed subject the conflict was about.
“RUPP Tera Mastana”: Shell Parties and Simulacra
This article argues that a growing subclass of Indian parties is not janaseva (public service) but a fiscal enterprise—the party as limited company—whose tax and registration privileges are harvested whether or not it fights an election. The 2025 BBC News Hindi investigation of six Gujarat Registered Unrecognised Political Parties (RUPPs) is the entry: about ₹1,700 crore in FY 2023–24 donations against fifteen Lok Sabha candidates. From that mismatch it names the shell party, analogue of the shell company: a valid, vacant recipient whose use is fiscal (or, as with the NCPI merger of twenty TMC MPs, parliamentary). A four-provision interlock—RPA 1951 §29A; Income Tax Act §§13A, 80GGB, 80GGC; Companies Act §182—run in reverse, turns taxable income into a deduction plus cash after commission. The same lawful opacity is set beside electoral bonds and their afterlife in trusts, PM CARES as an un-askable receptacle, Tenth Schedule “mergers” that launder benches, and, as ED allegation not verdict, the DHFL–RKW–Mirchi–Dawood chain beside ₹27.5 crore declared to the BJP. Letterheads out-raised every national party except the ruling one. Read as Baudrillard’s simulacrum and Habermas’s legitimation crisis—including the public charge of vote chori—the register simulates pluralism while hollowing representation. Reform only reshapes the shell. Equal to the climate polycrisis is a bioregional, moneyless, partyless commons.
খাওয়া-দাওয়ার রাজনীতি আর ইয়াং বেঙ্গল
থালার ওপর রাষ্ট্র চেপে বসা-মাত্রই গেরুয়া ফ্যাসিবাদ সরাসরি রান্নাঘরে ঢুকে পড়েছে। এই লেখা সেই “ঢুকে পড়বার” খবরাখবর দেয়—গোরক্ষার নামে ব্যাপক খুনোখুনি, “সনাতন” খাদ্যবিধির জবরদস্তি, আমিষ (বিশেষত গোমাংস)-ত্যাগের জোরজুলুম, আর সেই ভয়ের রাজনীতির বিপ্রতীপে হাজির হওয়া দুশো বছর আগের ইয়াং বেঙ্গল। ডিরোজিওর ছাত্র-সহযোদ্ধারা বউবাজারের গলিতে গরুর হাড় ছুঁড়েছিলেন। প্রমাণ করে দিয়েছিলেন যে “শুদ্ধতা”-র চাপিয়ে দেওয়া নির্মাণ আদৌ কোনো যৌক্তিক নৈতিকতার মানদণ্ড নয়, স্রেফ গোঁড়াদের সীমানা আঁকার তকনিক; গরু “মা” হয়ে ওঠা আর দলিত-মুসলমানকে বাইরে ঠেলে পিষে দেওয়া সেই একই খ্যামতা-দেহের যন্তর-তন্তর-মন্তর। বাংলার রান্নাঘর (সমসত্ব বর্গ নয়) কিছুদিন আগেও ছিল বহুস্বরের পরিসর; এখন সেখানে সঙ্ঘী সেন্সরেরা উঁকি মারে ইতিউতি। লেখার পরিশিষ্টে ব্যঙ্গপত্র আর বিফ-বাফ রপ্তানির হিসেব মিলে যায়—রাতে গোমাতা, দিনে মহিষমাংসের ডলার। ডিরোজিয়ানদের সেই উঠোনে ছুঁড়ে দেওয়া গো-হাড়টা আজও তাই মাটিতে পড়েনি। ওটা প্রশ্ন। প্রশ্ন ফিরে ফিরে আসে।
