This article offers a comprehensive, non-polemical examination of the accountability architecture governing credit rating agencies (CRAs) in India, focusing on CRISIL, CARE Ratings, and ICRA under the SEBI (Credit Rating Agencies) Regulations, 1999 (as amended through 2026). Situating itself in continuity with earlier analyses of Piramal Finance and Piramal Pharma ratings, it maps what CRAs are legally mandated to do, how the issuer-pays model structures incentives, and why regulation centered on process rather than outcomes produces a persistent accountability gap. Drawing on verifiable rating actions, enforcement precedents, and the DHFL collapse as a paradigmatic failure, the article demonstrates how credit ratings—legally framed as professional opinions rather than conclusive, decisive guarantees—shape capital flows and investor behaviour without imposing commensurate liability on agencies when optimism bias, delayed downgrades, or convergence errors materialize. It further shows how an oligopolistic market structure, implicit ratings shopping, and political–corporate crony concentration during the BJP regime dilute reputational discipline, transferring risk downstream to retail and public investors. Incorporating recent regulatory reforms and critiques, including debates on revenue diversification, expanded mandates, and transparency norms, the article argues that legality and compliance have been mistaken for responsibility. In conclusion, it frames India’s credit rating regime as a system of regulation without substantive accountability, where structural design—not isolated misconduct—explains recurring credit failures, and where incremental reforms remain insufficient without a fundamental rethinking of incentives, liability, and public interest protection.